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Abstract
Credit reports are used in nearly all consumer lending decisions and, increasingly, in hiring de-
cisions in the labor market, but the impact of a bad credit report is largely unknown. We study the
effects of credit reports on financial and labor market outcomes using a difference-in-differences
research design that compares changes in outcomes over time for Chapter 13 filers, whose personal
bankruptcy flags are removed from credit reports after 7 years, to changes for Chapter 7 filers,
whose personal bankruptcy flags are removed from credit reports after 10 years. Using credit bu-
reau data, we show that the removal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag leads to a large increase in
credit scores and economically significant increases in credit card and mortgage borrowing. Using
administrative tax records linked to personal bankruptcy records, we estimate a precise zero effect
of flag removal on employment and earnings outcomes. We rationalize these contrasting results by
showing that, conditional on basic observables, “hidden” bankruptcy flags are strongly correlated
with adverse credit market outcomes but have no predictive power for labor market outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The increasing availability and richness of credit report data is one of the most significant changes
to consumer financial markets in the last 25 years. In the United States, credit reports – and the
associated credit scores – are used in nearly all consumer lending decisions, including both approval
and pricing decisions for credit cards, private student loans, auto loans, and home mortgages. Credit
reports are also widely used in non-lending decisions, such as rental decisions for apartments and
hiring decisions in the labor market.1
Proponents of this trend argue that the increased use of credit reports is a key factor driving the
expansion of lending to traditionally underserved segments of the population, including minority
communities that have been historically shut out of formal credit markets (e.g., Staten, 2014). Crit-
ics recognize the importance of credit report data in theory, but argue that these benefits should be
weighed against individuals’ rights to privacy (Shorr, 1994) and the so-called right to be forgotten
(Steinberg, 2014). And critics have been particularly concerned about the use of credit reports in hir-
ing decisions in the labor market. In the years following the Great Recession, a series of prominent
news articles reported on how a bad credit report can be a major impediment to finding a job.2 Talking
to the New York Times, a lawyer at the National Consumer Law Center called the scenario “a bizarre,
Kafkaesque experience . . . Someone loses their job, so they can’t pay their bills – and now they can’t
get a job because they couldn’t pay their bills because they lost a job? It’s this Catch-22 that makes no
sense.” This debate is currently playing out across the country, with 11 states having passed laws to
restrict employer credit checks since 2007 and federal legislators having introduced a similar law in
2015.3 To date, however, there is little empirical evidence determining whether the anecdotal evidence
linking credit reports to employment represents a broad-based, causal phenomenon.
This paper estimates the causal effect of an improved credit report on financial and labor market
outcomes. Our research design uses the sharp removal of personal bankruptcy “flags” from credit
reports at statutorily determined time horizons. Nearly all households that declare bankruptcy file
1The Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM, 2010) reported that 60 percent of employers conducted back-
ground checks for some of their candidates in 2010, up from 25 percent of employers in 1998. See FRB (2007) and CFPB
(2012) for additional discussion on the uses of credit reports.
2See National Public Radio (2012) and New York Times (2013). The April 10th, 2016 episode of the TV Show “Last Week
Tonight with John Oliver” also reported on this issue.
3The federal bill, “The Equal Employment for All Act” (H.R. 321), aimed to “amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act to
prohibit the use of consumer credit checks against prospective and current employees for the purposes of making adverse
employment decisions.” The bill was introduced by Senator Elizabeth Warren in August 2015. See Clifford and Shoag (2016)
for more on these policies.
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under either Chapter 13 or Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.4 Under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (FCRA), credit bureaus are required to remove Chapter 7 bankruptcy flags ten years after filing.
In contrast, credit bureaus traditionally remove Chapter 13 flags only seven years after filing, three
years before the Chapter 7 flag is removed.5
We use this variation in a difference-in-differences research design that compares outcomes for
Chapter 13 filers (the “treatment” group), who have their flags removed at seven years, to Chapter 7
filers (the “control” group), who have their flags removed at ten years and are therefore unaffected
at the seven-year time horizon. The identifying assumption for this difference-in-differences speci-
fication is that, in the absence of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal, outcomes for treated and
control individuals would have evolved in parallel. To provide support for this “parallel trends” as-
sumption, we show that the path of outcomes for treated and control individual are virtually identical
in the pre-flag removal period.
We measure the effects of flag removal using two large administrative datasets. We examine the
effects on credit market outcomes – including credit scores and measures of both credit card and
mortgage borrowing – using a dataset generated from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Equifax
Consumer Credit Panel (CCP). Equifax is one of the three main credit bureaus, and their data provide
us with panel information on nearly all credit products held by an individual over time. To exam-
ine the effects on labor market outcomes, we use data from individual bankruptcy filings merged to
administrative tax records at the Social Security Administration (SSA). Our primary analysis sample,
which focuses on prime-age adults with a bankruptcy flag removal between 2002 and 2011, covers
roughly 400,000 individuals in the Equifax sample and 4.7 million individuals in the SSA sample.
We begin our analysis by examining the “first stage” effect of the bankruptcy flag removal on
credit scores. Since credit scores are used in the vast majority of lending decisions, improvements in
credit scores directly translate into increased credit availability, lower interest rates, or both. We show
that bankruptcy flag removal leads to an immediate 10 point increase in credit scores on a pre-flag
removal mean of 596. The jump occurs precisely in the quarter of bankruptcy flag removal and its
4Under Chapter 7, debtors forfeit all non-exempt assets in exchange for a discharge of eligible debts and protection from
future wage garnishment. Under Chapter 13, filers propose a three- to five-year plan to repay part of their unsecured debt
in exchange for a discharge of the remaining unsecured debt, protection from future wage garnishment, and protection of
most assets. Nearly all unsecured debts are eligible for discharge under both chapters, including credit card debt, installment
loans, medical debt, unpaid rent and utility bills, tort judgments, and business debt. See Section 3 for additional details of
the bankruptcy system in the United States.
5Under FCRA, Chapter 13 flags are not mandated to be removed earlier than Chapter 7 flags, but all three national
credit bureaus do so voluntarily. All three credit bureaus state that the Chapter 13 flag is removed at seven years in their
documentation, and we have confirmed this independently using the Equifax credit report data described below. We have
also confirmed that the Chapter 7 flag is removed at ten years, as mandated by the FRCA, using the Equifax data.
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impact declines over time. Since credit scores are based on a regression of default on observables, we
can interpret the effect in terms of a change in the implied probability of default. Using this measure,
we find that flag removal leads to a 3 percentage point decline in the implied default probability on a
pre-flag removal mean of 32 percent (roughly a 10 percent decrease in riskiness).
We next show that flag removal has a statistically and economically significant effect on credit card
borrowing. The effect appears immediately and grows linearly over time. At a three-year horizon, we
estimate that flag removal increases credit limits by $1,510 on a pre-flag removal mean of $3,027 and
raises credit card balances by $800 on a pre-flag removal mean of $1,911. The ratio of the increase in
balances to the increase in credit limits is 53 percent, although we caution that the effect should not
be interpreted as a pure MPC out of liquidity because some of the effect may operate through lower
interest rates, which we do not observe. Credit limits are also determined by credit card balances, so
this ratio may reflect some reverse causality.
We find a similarly large effect on mortgage borrowing. In contrast to the credit card results, the
mortgage effect is concentrated in the first year. One year after flag removal, the fraction of individ-
uals with a mortgage increases by 1.9 percentage points on a pre-flag removal mean of 41.3 percent.
In heterogeneity analysis, we show that the effect is concentrated among individuals who had their
flags removed during the 2008 to 2011 period, with no mortgage effect of flag removal in prior years.
These results are consistent with widespread mortgage access in the run-up to the Financial Crisis
when subprime mortgage lenders provided loans to consumers with blemished credit reports, and
substantial pent-up demand in the post-crisis period due to significantly tighter lending standards in
the mortgage market.
In stark contrast to our credit market results, we estimate a precise zero effect of flag removal
on labor market outcomes. At a three-year horizon, the 95 percent confidence intervals allow us to
rule out employment effects greater than 0.4 percentage points and earnings effects greater than 0.8
percent. We estimate similarly precise zero effects on self-employment and self-employment earnings,
indicating that these results are not masking reallocation between different types of work.
Because of the contrary anecdotal evidence linking credit reports and employment, we conduct
a broad set of heterogeneity and sensitivity analyses of these labor market results. (i) We estimate
precise and economically small effects for different demographic groups, including for minorities for
whom there has been particular concern about the employment consequences of derogatory credit
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reports.6 (ii) We find economically small effects across the business cycle, including just after the
Financial Crisis when labor markets were slack. (iii) We find no economically significant effect on em-
ployment dynamics, including the “no job” to “any job” transition, where one might expect to see the
largest employment response. (iv) We also find no evidence of economically significant employment
shifts towards industries like finance, which more frequently use credit checks to screen applicants
(SHRM, 2010).
Next, we explore the external validity of our labor market results. One potential limitation of our
preferred research design is that it identifies the local average treatment effect (LATE) of removing a
bankruptcy flag seven years after filing. Survey evidence indicates that bankruptcy flags are one of the
key variables that employers consider and that a seven-year time horizon after filing is within the look-
back period that many employers typically scrutinize (SHRM, 2010). However, if employers place
weight on other derogatory items (e.g., default flags) and down-weight a seven-year-old bankruptcy
flag relative to a more recent indicator, directly extrapolating from our LATE to the effects of a broader
restriction on employer credit checks would be inappropriate.
To address this potential limitation, we conduct a separate difference-in-differences analysis of
the state-level bans on employer credit checks that were implemented in the second half of our sam-
ple period. To focus on individuals affected by the ban, we restrict our analysis to individuals with
bankruptcy flags that have not been removed. This state-ban research design therefore captures the
LATE of removing a bankruptcy flag at earlier time horizons (i.e., before seven years) than the analysis
of bankruptcy flag removals. Using the SSA data described above, we estimate an economically and
statistically insignificant effect of the state credit check bans on employment and earnings outcomes,
bolstering the externality validity of our earlier findings.
In the last part of the paper, we consider two potential explanations for the zero labor market
effect. The first potential explanation is countervailing effects of bankruptcy flag removal on labor
supply and labor demand. In particular, since flag removal increases access to credit, it might reduce
labor supply through a credit smoothing channel, thereby offsetting any increase in employers’ labor
demand. The zero effect of state-level bans on employer credit checks provides evidence against this
explanation. Since these bans did not affect what information lenders can observe, and therefore did
not have a direct effect on access to credit, they should isolate the effect of derogatory credit report
6For instance, the NAACP and National Council of La Raza, among many other organizations, wrote a letter advocating
for the “The Equal Employment for All Act” (H.R. 321), which aimed “to prohibit employers from using credit checks as part
of their hiring and promotion decisions for most positions,” because they viewed credit checks as discriminatory, among
other reasons. The bill was introduced in January 2011, but did not pass.
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information on employers’ labor demand. The zero effect in this state-ban analysis therefore indicates
that an offsetting labor supply effect is unlikely to explain our result.
We further investigate this theory by exploiting heterogeneity across individuals in the effect of
flag removal on credit access. We show that there is a zero employment effect across individuals with
different pre-flag removal credit card utilization rates, including individuals with relatively low credit
card utilization. Since individuals with low pre-flag removal utilization were not credit constrained,
this analysis isolates a group of individuals for whom changes in employers’ labor demand should
be the dominant force. In a second test, we show that the employment effect is also zero across indi-
viduals with different size increases in credit limits, including individuals with very small credit limit
changes for whom the labor demand effect should again be dominant. These results further suggest
that a countervailing labor supply effect cannot explain the zero labor market effect.
The second potential explanation for the zero labor market effect is that bankruptcy flags may
have little value in predicting future job performance. We investigate this theory by examining the
explanatory value of “hidden” bankruptcy flags, i.e. recently removed bankruptcy flags that are ob-
served by the econometrician but unobserved by new lenders and employers. We measure the in-
formational content of these hidden flags by comparing the job outcomes of individuals who had a
Chapter 13 flag removed in the prior year (and therefore have a hidden flag) to observably similar
individuals who never declared bankruptcy (and therefore do not have a hidden flag).
We first confirm that hidden bankruptcy flags are strongly predictive of future loan performance.
Conditional on lagged credit scores, a hidden bankruptcy flag is associated with a 6.4 percentage point
increase in the probability of having a credit card delinquency in the next three years relative to a non-
filer mean of 19.3 percent. For mortgage debt, individuals with a hidden flag are 10.8 percentage points
more likely to have a delinquency relative to a non-filer mean of 11.7 percent. In contrast, we find no
correlation between the hidden bankruptcy flags and measures of job performance. Conditional on
starting wage decile and industry, a hidden flag is associated with less than a 0.1 percentage point
difference in the probability of being at the same job three years later relative to a non-filer mean of
35.2 percent. For employment at any firm, the difference is less than 0.3 percentage points relative to
a non-filer mean of 83.9 percent. These results suggest that bankruptcy flags have limited value for
predicting future job performance, rationalizing the zero labor market effect documented above.
We conclude that credit reports are important for credit market outcomes, where they are the
primary source of information used to screen applicants and have substantial predictive power for
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future default, but are of limited consequence for labor market outcomes, where employers rely on a
much broader set of screening mechanisms and bankruptcy flags have no additional predictive power
on the margin. Our results suggest that employers purchase credit reports for non-performance-based
reasons such as reducing legal liability or complying with legal background check requirements. Our
results also suggest that legislative attempts to limit the use of credit reports by employers are unlikely
to affect the labor market outcomes studied in this paper, either positively or negatively.7
Our paper is related to a number of recent working papers that examine the effects of credit reports
on credit and labor market outcomes conducted in parallel to our study.8 Gross, Notowidigdo and
Wang (2016) use credit bureau data and an event-study design to estimate the effect of bankruptcy
flag removal on credit card limits and credit card balances. Their implied MPC estimate is similar
to ours, but their main objective is to estimate heterogeneity in the MPC over the business cycle.
Herkenhoff, Phillips and Cohen-Cole (2016) use administrative employment data from the Census
and an event-study design to estimate the employment consequences of bankruptcy flag removal.
Like us, they find zero or very small effects of flag removal on self-employment and formal sector
employment and earnings. They do, however, find that flag removal increases churn in and out of
employment, and use these results to calibrate a directed search model of labor market transitions.
Clifford and Shoag (2016) use employment and credit score data aggregated to the Census tract level
and a state-year difference-in-differences research design to study the aggregate employment effects
of recent state-level restrictions on employer credit checks. They find that restrictions have a zero
average effect among Census tracts with average credit scores below 650. However, in subsample
analysis, the authors find positive effects for census tracts with the lowest average credit scores. These
estimates contrast with our individual-level results that show no employment effects across the credit
score distribution for bankruptcy filers.
Finally, outside of the United States, our research is related to a paper by Bos, Breza and Liberman
(2016) that studies a policy that reduced the time that information on default was listed on credit
reports in Sweden. Their analysis focuses on individuals who defaulted on a pawnshop loan, who
make up around two percent of the Swedish population (Bos, Carter and Skiba, 2012). They find
7Our results are silent, however, on whether these laws would affect job application behavior or any form of statistical
discrimination.
8The recent literature builds on work by Musto (2004), who studies the impact of bankruptcy flag removal on credit
scores and credit card borrowing using an event-study design. Musto (2004) finds that flag removal has a sharp short-run
effect on credit scores and credit card borrowing, but has adverse longer-run consequences. In contrast, our difference-
in-differences research design, which is better suited to study longer-run effects, does not show such strong evidence of
adverse longer-run outcomes.
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that the removal of default information leads to a 3 percentage point increase in employment. By
comparison, we focus on individuals who have filed for bankruptcy, which make up approximately
15 percent of the United States population according to our calculations using the CCP data, and we
rule out employment effects greater than 0.4 percentage points with 95 percent confidence. We are
also unable to find any subgroup for whom employment effects are larger than 3 percentage points,
suggesting that the labor market effects of bad credit reports are much smaller in the United States
than Sweden, at least for the respective populations examined in these studies.9
The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background on credit reporting and
describes our data. In Section 3, we present our research design. Section 5 presents our results for the
credit market and labor market outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Credit Reporting
The history of credit reporting in the United States can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when
third parties sold lists of deadbeat borrowers to local merchants. The credit reporting industry grew
throughout the twentieth century, but remained highly fragmented, with 2,250 local and regional firms
as of 1970. During the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid growth in credit card lending fueled an expansion
and consolidation of the credit bureau industry. Today, there are three national credit reporting agen-
cies – Equifax, TransUnion, and Experian – that provide most credit reports. See CFPB (2012) for more
on the history of the credit reporting system.
Along with basic information on name, address, and Social Security number (SSN), consumer
credit reports provide four main categories of information:
(i) The tradeline segment provides information on contract characteristics, utilization, and delin-
quency or default at the product level. For instance, for an individual credit card, the tradeline
data include information on the credit limit, account balance, and whether the consumer is in
delinquency or default. The tradeline data are provided to the credit bureaus by the lenders,
which are typically large national banks.
9Bos, Breza and Liberman (2016) estimate that the removal of default information increases credit by about $105 over
their time horizon, with an implied annual effect of $236. We find that the removal of a personal bankruptcy flag increases
credit card borrowing by $799 after three years, implying an annualized effect of $267 dollars. We also find increases in
mortgage borrowing of 1.0 to 1.8 percent. These results suggest that our (null) labor market findings are not the result of a
weak “first stage.”
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(ii) The public records segment includes information on bankruptcies and tax liens. Non-financially
relevant public information, such as marriage records, are not included in the credit report.
These data are obtained from the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system
and government offices.
(iii) The collections segment provides information on debts under collection and is reported to the
credit bureaus by third-party collection agencies.
(iv) The inquiries segment provides information on consumer-initiated credit requests, known as
“hard” inquiries. “Soft” inquiries, which result, for example, from a bank-initiated pre-screening,
are typically not reported.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (1970) limits the amount of time that information can be maintained
on credit reports. Chapter 7 bankruptcies may be listed for ten years after the order for relief or
date of adjudication. Conversely, information on Chapter 13 bankruptcies is traditionally removed
after a period of only seven years.10 The FCRA also stipulates that information on late payments,
delinquencies, and collection items be removed after seven years.
Requestors of credit bureau information do not necessarily receive the full set of credit bureau
data. Potential employers, for instance, usually receive modified credit reports that do not contain
date of birth or credit scores. Lenders, on the other hand, usually receive at least one consumer credit
score, in addition to all of the standard credit report information. These credit scores are sometimes
developed by third parties, such as the Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO), and sometimes developed by
the credit bureaus themselves (e.g., the VantageScore). There are also dozens of different types of
credit scores, each based on different outcome variables and used for different types of lending de-
cisions. The most commonly used credit scores aim to predict the probability that a consumer will
become 90+ days delinquent on a new loan within the next 24 months. See CFPB (2012) for more
background on the U.S. credit reporting system.
2.2 Data Sources and Sample Construction
We use two separate datasets to estimate the impact of removing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag on
credit scores, financial outcomes, and formal sector employment and earnings. The first dataset uses
10Under FCRA, Chapter 13 flags are not mandated to be removed earlier than Chapter 7 flags, but all three national
credit bureaus do so voluntarily. All three credit bureaus state that the Chapter 13 flag is removed at seven years in their
documentation, and we have confirmed this independently using the Experian credit report data described below. We have
also confirmed that the Chapter 7 flag is removed at ten years, as mandated by the FRCA, using the Experian data.
8
information from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Equifax Consumer Credit Panel (CCP).
The second dataset uses information from individual bankruptcy filings merged to administrative tax
records at the Social Security Administration (SSA).
The first dataset used in our analysis is constructed using records from the CCP, a representative
five percent random sample of all individuals in the U.S. with credit files.11 Like other credit report
data, the CCP data are derived from public records, collections agencies, and trade lines data from
lending institutions. The data include a comprehensive set of consumer credit outcomes, including
information on credit scores, unsecured credit lines, auto loans, and mortgages. The data also include
year of birth and geographic location at the ZIP-code level. No other demographic information is
available at the individual level. Importantly, the data also include information on the bankruptcy
chapter, the bankruptcy outcome, and the quarter that a bankruptcy flag is both placed and removed
from the credit file.12 The CCP data are available quarterly from 1999 to 2015. See Avery et al. (2003)
and Lee and der Klaauw (2010) for additional details.
We make three sample restrictions to the CCP data. First, we restrict the sample to individuals
who filed for bankruptcy protection between 1995 and 2004. This restriction allows us to observe
credit outcomes both before and after the flag removal. Second, we restrict our sample to individuals
who were between 23 and 47 years old at filing – and therefore between 30 and 54 years old at seven
years after filling – to focus on working-age adults. Third, we restrict the sample to individuals who
completed the bankruptcy process, receiving what is known as a discharge.13
The second dataset constructed for this study consists of individual bankruptcy filings merged to
administrative tax records at the SSA. Bankruptcy records are available from 1992 to 2009 for the 81
(out of 94) federal bankruptcy courts that allow full electronic access to their dockets.14 We matched
the individual-level bankruptcy records to administrative tax records from the SSA using last name
and the last four digits of the filer’s SSN. We were able to successfully match over 90 percent of the
11The CCP data is a representative sample of all individuals with a credit file but does not include the roughly 11 percent
of the U.S. population without credit files. As a result, the CCP data will be more representative for high-income individuals
than for low-income individuals.
12We are unable to observe filing quarter for individuals filing before the first quarter of 1991. For these individuals, we
infer the filing quarter based on when their bankruptcy flag is removed from their credit report. Specifically, we impute the
filing quarter as being seven years before the quarter of flag removal for Chapter 13 filers, and ten years before the quarter
of flag removal for Chapter 7 filers. In results available upon request, we find that the number of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
filings in the CCP data closely track the number of filings observed in administrative bankruptcy records.
13Chapter 13 filers who do not receive a discharge have their flags removed after ten years and therefore cannot be used
in our research design.
14We thank Tal Gross, Matthew Notowidigdo, and Jialan Wang for providing the bankruptcy data used in this analysis.
See Gross, Notowidigdo and Wang (2014) for additional details on the PACER bankruptcy data.
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bankruptcy records, with nearly all of the unmatched records resulting from a shared name and last
four digits of the SSN in the SSA data.15 The SSA data include information on all formal sector earn-
ings and employment from annual W-2s and self-employment earnings from annual 1040s at the IRS.
Individuals with no W-2 or self-employment earnings in any particular year are assumed to have had
no formal sector earnings in that year. Individuals with zero earnings are included in all regressions
throughout the paper. The SSA data are available annually from 1978 to 2014.
Following our sample restrictions for the CCP data, we restrict the matched bankruptcy-SSA data
to individuals who filed for bankruptcy protection between 1995 and 2004, were between 30 and
54 years old seven years after filing, and successfully completed the bankruptcy process. All dollar
amounts in the SSA dataset are adjusted to year 2013 dollars using the CPI-U.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the CCP and SSA data, for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filers
separately, and for the combined sample.
3 Research Design
We estimate the impact of bankruptcy flag removal using a difference-in-differences research design
that compares the outcomes of Chapter 13 filers (the “treatment” group), who have their flags removed
at seven years, to the outcomes of Chapter 7 filers (the “control” group), who have their flags removed
at ten years and are therefore unaffected at the seven-year time horizon.
Our sample of 1995 to 2004 bankruptcy filings occurred before the 2005 bankruptcy reform (i.e.,
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, or BAPCPA). Below we pro-
vide a brief overview of Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy under the pre-reform bankruptcy code;
see Dobbie and Song (2015), Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yang (2015) and Mahoney (2015) for a
more in-depth treatment. Under Chapter 7, bankruptcy filers forfeit all non-exempt assets in exchange
for a discharge of eligible debts and protection from future wage garnishment. Nearly all unsecured
debts are eligible for discharge under Chapter 7, including credit card debt, installment loans, medi-
cal debt, unpaid rent and utility bills, tort judgments, and business debt. Student loans, child support
obligations, and debts incurred by fraud cannot be discharged under Chapter 7, and secured debts
such as mortgages, home equity loans, and automobile loans can only be discharged if filers give up
the collateral.
15The SSA data include every individual who has ever acquired an SSN, including those who are institutionalized. How-
ever, illegal immigrants without a valid SSN are not included in the SSA data. The SSA data also does not include informa-
tion on informal earnings or employment.
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Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy, filers propose a three- to five-year plan to partially repay their
unsecured debt in exchange for a discharge of the remaining unsecured debt, a hold on debt collection,
and the retention of most assets. Chapter 13 requires filers to use all of their disposable income,
defined as their predicted income less predicted expenses, to repay creditors. Creditors must receive
at least as much as they would have received if the filer’s assets were liquidated under Chapter 7,
a requirement known as the “best interest of creditors” test. Chapter 13 filers are also required to
fully repay priority claims, such as child support and alimony, unless the claimant agrees to a reduced
payment. If a filer wants to keep any collateral securing a claim, he or she must keep up to date on all
current payments and include any arrears in the repayment plan. The filer can also choose to give up
the collateral and discharge the remaining debt.16
In any given year, approximately 70 percent of filers choose Chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code,
with the remaining 30 percent choosing Chapter 13 (White, 2007). One reason why individuals choose
Chapter 13 is that it allows filers to avoid a home foreclosure or the repossession of a car by including
any arrears in the repayment plan, with the original debt contract reinstated on completion of the
Chapter 13 repayment plan. Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, the biggest difference between Chapter 13
and Chapter 7 filers in Table 1 is the fraction of individuals with a mortgage (41.6 percent for Chapter
13 filers versus 32.6 percent for Chapter 7 filers). However, there is also evidence that filers are steered
into Chapter 13 by lawyers who earn larger payments from Chapter 13 filings, generating variation
in filing chapter that is more likely to be uncorrelated with the individual’s financial circumstances
(Braucher, Cohen and Lawless, 2012). As we discuss below, our research design does not rely on
the random assignment of filing chapter. Rather, the key identifying assumption for our difference-
in-differences specification is that the differences in outcomes for Chapter 13 versus Chapter 7 filers
would have evolved in parallel in the absence of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal.
We conduct our analysis using individual-level data collapsed to a more aggregate level to speed
up the regression analysis. In the CCP data, we collapse by the full interaction of chapter of filing,
cohort of filing, time period, state of residence, and five-year age bins. In the SSA data, we also observe
race (defined as white or non-white) and gender, so we additionally collapse on these dimensions.17
In our regression specifications, we weight each of the resulting cells by the number of underlying
16In our main results, we include all Chapter 13 filers, regardless of repayment plan length. In results available upon
request, we find identical results restricting the sample to filers with either 3-year or 5-year repayment plans.
17In the CCP data, cohort and time period are defined at the year-quarter level and state of residence is defined using
the state of residence six years after filing. In the SSA data, which is only available at the annual level, we define cohorts
and time periods at the year level and state of residence is defined at the time of filing. We have examined the effect of flag
removal on state of residence and find no effect. These results are available upon request.
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individual observations so that our estimates are representative of the underlying individual-level
data. As we discuss below, collapsing the data does not affect the statistical inference because we
cluster our standard errors above the level of aggregation.
The precise regression specifications will naturally differ based on whether we use the quarterly
CCP data or the annual SSA data. Consider first the quarterly CCP data. Let i index filing groups,
defined by the full interaction of chapter of filing, cohort of filling, state of residence, and 5-year age
bin. Let s index calendar-time, defined at the year-quarter level. Let t indicate event-time, defined as
quarters relative to the seven-year horizon when Chapter 13 bankruptcy flags removed. We define t
using this seven-year horizon for both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers even though Chapter 7 filers
have their flags removed at ten years. The collapsed data is at the i× t level.
For a given outcome, yit, our difference-in-differences regression specification takes the form:




βt · 1(Chapter 13)
]
+ ε it, (1)
where αi are filing group fixed effects, αt are event-time fixed effects, αs(i,t) are calendar-time fixed
effects, 1(Chapter 13) is an indicator for filing under Chapter 13, and βt are coefficients on Chapter
13 that vary non-parametrically by event time. We omit the period prior to flag removal, βt=−1, so
that the other βt’s can be interpreted relative to this pre-removal baseline period. We also drop the
base effect for the quarter prior to flag removal, αt=−1, as it is not separately identified from the other
fixed effects in the specification. When we estimate this model using the annual SSA data, the event-
time and calendar-time fixed effects are defined at the annual level, but otherwise the specification is
unchanged.18
In this specification, the βt coefficients for t > 0 can be interpreted as the differential change in
yit for Chapter 13 filers relative to Chapter 7 filers following the Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal.
The identifying assumption is parallel trends: conditional on our controls, yit would have followed a
similar evolution for both groups of filers in the absence of the Chapter 13 flag removal. This identi-
fying assumption would be violated if Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers have different trends in t. For
example, our identifying assumption would be violated if Chapter 13 filers recover either faster or
18In this specification, we are only able to control for year, rather than year-quarter, calendar-time fixed effects due to the
collinearity of the event-time and calendar-time fixed effects. In our table results, we are able to control for year-quarter
calendar-time fixed effects since our event-time estimates are simplified into three coefficients. When we estimate this
specification using the annual SSA data, we are analogously only able to control for two-year calendar-time fixed effects
when we include all event-time fixed effects, but are able to control for single-year calendar-time fixed effects in the tables,
where our event-time estimates are again simplified into three coefficients.
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slower from a bankruptcy filing compared to Chapter 7 filers.
Our main approach to assess the validity of this assumption is to examine outcomes for the treated
and control filers in the pre-flag removal period. As discussed below, our plots of the raw data and the
non-parametric specifications both show that outcomes for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers move in
close parallel during the pre-flag removal period for most outcomes. These results give us confidence
that our control group is valid and that it provides us with an accurate counterfactual for what would
have happened to the treatment group in the absence of flag removal.
To gauge the magnitude and statistical significance of the results in the quarterly CCP data, we
also estimate a specification that pools the effect across sets of consecutive quarters in the post-flag
removal period. Specifically, we estimate a specification where we replace the quarter-specific co-
efficients in the post-flag removal period with three post-flag removal coefficients: β1, which pools
over quarters t ∈ [0, 4), β2, which pools over quarters t ∈ [4, 8), and β3, which pools over quarters
t ∈ [8, 12). Other than these pooled coefficients, the specification is identical to that in Equation (1).
Since our SSA data is already annual, we do not need to run a different pooled specification in these
data.
In all specifications, we cluster our standard errors at the full interaction of the chapter of filing,
cohort of filing, and state of residence in the pre-flag removal period. This approach is more conserva-
tive than clustering at the individual level, and, for example, allows individuals who filed for Chapter
13 in California in 1998 to face correlated credit and labor market shocks when their bankruptcy flags
are removed in 2005.
4 Results
In this section, we examine the effects of the Chapter 13 flag removal using our difference-in-differences
research design. We first analyze the effects of flag removal on credit scores, before turning to its effects
on credit card borrowing, mortgage borrowing, and labor market outcomes.
4.1 Credit Scores
We begin with a descriptive analysis of how credit scores evolve for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy
filers just before and just after flag removal. Since credit scores are used in the vast majority of lending
decisions, improvements in credit scores should directly translate into increased credit availability,
lower interest rates, or both (FRB, 2007).
Figure 1 provides some background on credit scores. The credit score we observe – the Equifax
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Risk Score 3.0 – is the output of “a general-purpose risk model that predicts the likelihood of a con-
sumer becoming seriously delinquent (i.e., 90+ days past due) within 24 months of scoring.”19 The
observed credit score is constructed as an odds-scale measure of risk, with the odds of going seriously
delinquent doubling for every 33 point decline in the credit score measure. The exact credit score
formula is a proprietary trade secret.20
Panel A of Figure 1 plots the distribution of credit scores for a representative, unrestricted sample
of the CCP data and for our analysis sample of bankruptcy filers. In the representative sample, credit
scores have a mean of 686 and an interquartile range of 607 to 778. Our analysis sample is drawn
from the lower part of the distribution, and has a mean of 600 and an interquartile range of 553 to 658.
Panel B shows the relationship between observed credit scores and serious delinquency (90+ days past
due).21 The mean credit score of 600 in our analysis sample corresponds to a 30.2 percent probability
of default in the following two years. To facilitate the economic interpretation of the effect on credit
scores, we construct an alternative outcome measure called the implied probability of default, which is
simply the credit score mapped into a probability of default using the relationship shown in Panel B
of Figure 1.
Figure 2 plots average credit scores and the implied probability of default for Chapter 13 filers
(the “treatment” group) and Chapter 7 filers (the “control” group) for each quarter relative to Chapter
13 flag removal. The vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of
Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs three years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value
of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal.
Panel A shows that prior to flag removal, credit scores for both groups trend upwards together,
confirming the parallel trends identifying assumption. In the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal,
there is a clear jump of approximately ten points for the credit scores of Chapter 13 filers. After flag
removal, average credit scores for Chapter 7 filers continue their upward trend, although at a slightly
lower rate, and average credit scores for Chapter 13 filers decline slightly in absolute value and more
strongly relative to the Chapter 7 control group.22 At three years post-removal, the credit scores of
19See http://www.equifax.com/biz/debt_recovery_pdfs/EFS-670-ADV%20ERS%203.0.pdf
20The FICO credit score is constructed in a similar fashion. See CFPB (2011) for more information.
21To avoid complications from over-time variation in default rates, the figure focuses on credit scores in the first quarter
of 2005 and default rates in the first quarter of 2007, which is a time period near the midpoint of our sample.
22The decrease in slope is due to a change in the rate of removal of flags for delinquencies and collections items, which
are also removed after seven years for both Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers. Accounting for the change in slope is a key
advantage of our difference-in-differences research design relative to an event study design without a control group of
Chapter 7 filers. The change in slope occurs for the following reason: Since individuals are receiving flags for delinquencies
and collections items prior to filing for bankruptcy, the upward slope in credit scores partially reflects the removal of these
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Chapter 13 filers remain approximately 3 points above those of Chapter 7 filers.
Panel B shows trends for the implied probability of default. The pre-flag removal trend is down-
ward because of the inverse relationship between credit scores and default probabilities. In the quarter
of Chapter 13 flag removal, the implied probability of default drops by approximately 3 percentage
points on a pre-removal mean on 32 percent. Post-flag removal, there is some reversion, and at three
years post-flag removal, there is only a 0.5 percentage point difference between Chapter 13 and Chap-
ter 7 filers in the implied probability of default.
Table 2 shows results from our parametric difference-in-differences regressions that pool the effect
across the first, second, and third years after flag removal. In these specifications, we omit the quarter
before flag removal, so that the effects can be interpreted relative to the pre-removal period. We
also control for chapter-by-cohort-by-age-by-state and calendar-year fixed effects and cluster standard
errors at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. The point estimates indicate that credit scores increase
by 9.8, 6.3, and 3.2 points, and that the implied probability of default declines by 2.6, 1.6, and 0.6
percentage points in the first, second, and third years after flag removal, respectively.
Appendix Figure A1 plots the coefficient of interest from the non-parametric difference-in-differences
specification shown in Equation (1) with credit scores and the implied probability of default as the
dependent variables. The plots show no systematic relationship between flag removal and these out-
come variables in the pre-removal quarters, providing support for our parallel trends identifying as-
sumption, and more generally corroborating our results on the timing and size of the effect.
In the Appendix, we examine heterogeneity by predicted pre-flag removal credit score.23 In par-
ticular, Appendix Figure A2 plots average credit scores for Chapter 13 filers and Chapter 7 filers for
different quartiles of the predicted pre-flag removal credit score, and Appendix Table A1 shows esti-
mates from our corresponding non-parametric specification that pools effects by year. The degree of
reversion to pre-removal credit scores is decreasing sharply in predicted credit score. For the lowest
flags prior to bankruptcy flag removal. However, individuals are no longer receiving new delinquencies and collections
flags after bankruptcy filing, so there are no more removals of delinquencies and collections flags after the bankruptcy flag
removal, and hence the slope of credit scores is flatter. See Dobbie, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Yang (2015) for an analysis
of pre- and post-filing trends in credit scores, delinquencies, collection items, and other credit market outcomes, and see
Dobbie and Song (2015) for an analogous analysis on pre- and post-filing trends in labor market outcomes.
23In our setting, segmenting the data by actual pre-flag removal credit score is problematic because it is difficult to separate
changes in credit scores due to mean reversion (i.e., low credit scores rising and high credit scores falling) and due to
heterogeneity in the causal effect of flag removals. For example, mean reversion occurs in our setting when an individual
accidentally misses a payment, has their score lowered, and then catches up on the overdue payment, and has their score
immediately recover. In this scenario, we would mistakenly attribute the rise in credit scores to a larger treatment effect.
To overcome this issue, we split the data on stable characteristics that are predictive of credit scores but do not suffer from
mean reversion. Specifically, we segment the data by first running a linear regression of pre-flag removal credit score on
fully interacted fixed effects for age group and state of residence, and then bin the data based on the predicted credit scores
from this regression.
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predicted credit score quartile, average credit scores for the treated Chapter 13 filers drop below the
average credit scores for the Chapter 7 control group two to three years post-removal. Conversely, for
the highest predicted credit score quartile, average credit scores for the treated Chapter 13 filers drop
very little in absolute or relative terms. While interesting, these results do not have a clear interpreta-
tion, as changes in credit scores across groups reflect both heterogeneity in economic outcomes, and
functional form and other modeling assumptions that go into the credit score formula.24
4.2 Credit Card Debt
We examine two summary measures for credit card borrowing: (i) credit limits aggregated across all
cards, and (ii) total balances aggregated across all cards. Balances reported in the credit bureau data
reflect interest bearing debt, which the consumer pays interest on, and transaction volume, which is
fully repaid at the end of the billing cycle and therefore does not accrue interest. However, Agar-
wal et al. (2015) show that for consumers with credit scores in the bottom quartile of the distribution,
which is representative of the sample analyzed in this paper, more than 90 percent of balances is of the
interest bearing variety, suggesting that interpreting balances as borrowing is a reasonable approxi-
mation.
Figure 3 shows average credit limits and balances for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers for each
quarter relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal. Table 3 shows estimates from the cor-
responding differences-in-differences regressions that pool the effect across the first, second, and
third years after flag removal. Appendix Figure A4 plots of the coefficients of interest from the non-
parametric specification shown in Equation (1).
There is an economically and statistically significant impact of flag removal on both credit card
limits and balances that grows fairly linearly over time. The regression estimates in Table 3 show
that flag removal increases credit limits by an average of $503 per year. In particular, at three years
after flag removal, credit limits have increased by $1,510 on a pre-flag removal mean of $3,027, or 50
percent. Credit card balances increase by an average of $267 per year. At three years after flag removal,
balances have increased by $800 on a pre-flag removal mean of $1,911, or 42 percent. Consistent with
the credit score results, both figures show no pre-trend in credit card limits or balances.
It is inappropriate to interpret the ratio of the increase in balances to the increase in credit limits
as a pure marginal propensity to consume out of liquidity (MPC) – such as that estimated in Gross
24For completeness, Appendix Figure A3 and Appendix Table A1 show the analogous plots and parameter estimates
with the implied probability of default as the dependent variable. Other than the inverse relationship, the patterns are
qualitatively very similar.
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and Souleles (2002) or Agarwal et al. (2015) – for a number of reasons. First, bankruptcy flag removal
likely leads to a reduction in interest rates, and thus the increase in balances reflects both liquidity
and price effects. Second, balances probably include a small amount of transaction volume that does
not accrue interest, and debatably should not be considered borrowing. Third, there may be some
reverse causality if higher credit limits raise balances, but then higher balances have a feedback effect
on credit limits. These issues notwithstanding, taking the ratio of the increase in credit card balances
to the increase in credit card limits results in a value of 53 percent at the three-year horizon, relative
to a pre-flag removal utilization rate of 63 percent. These values are large, but almost identical to
the MPC out of liquidity estimated in Agarwal et al. (2015) for the bottom quartile of the credit score
distribution.
In the Appendix, we examine heterogeneity in these effects by predicted pre-flag removal credit
score, following the procedure outlined in the credit score heterogeneity analysis. Appendix Figures
A5 and A7 show trends plots of the effects on credit limits and balances, and Appendix Table A1 shows
the parameter estimates. The effect on credit limits and balances are increasing in pre-flag removal
credit score. The ratio of the increase in balances to credit limits declines modestly in predicted pre-
flag removal credit score, from 67 percent in the bottom quartile to 56 percent at the top quartile, based
on the effects at three years after flag removal.25
4.3 Mortgage Debt
We examine two measures of mortgage borrowing: (i) an indicator for whether the individual has at
least one mortgage, and (ii) the natural logarithm of aggregate mortgage balances plus one. We use the
logarithm of aggregate mortgage balances, rather than the unadjusted level, because the distribution
of mortgage balances is highly right-skewed. We add one so that we can keep observations with
no mortgage balances, and hence capture both extensive and intensive margin changes in mortgage
borrowing.
Figure 4 shows the averages values of these outcomes for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers in
each quarter relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal. Table 4 shows estimates from the
corresponding differences-in-differences regressions that pool the effect across the first, second, and
third years after flag removal. Appendix Figure A8 plots of the coefficients of interest from the non-
25In Appendix Figure A6, we examine the responsiveness of credit card limits and balances to changes in the implied
probability of default. We find that an immediate one percentage point decrease in the implied probability of default in-
creases credit card limits by approximately 300 dollars two years later. In Panel B, we find that a similar decrease in the
implied probability of default increases balances by around 100 dollars two years later.
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parametric specification shown in Equation (1).
There is an economically and statistically significant effect of flag removal on both the probability
of having at least one mortgage and the aggregate measure of mortgage debt. The effects occur almost
immediately after Chapter 13 flag removal but fade out over the next three years. The regression
estimates in Table 4 show that in the first year after flag removal, the fraction of individuals with a
mortgage increases by 1.9 percentage points on a pre-flag removal mean of 41.3 percent, or 4.6 percent.
Aggregate mortgage balances (plus one) increase by 21 log points in the first year. For the standard
reason, this estimate should be interpreted as the average proportional increase in mortgage balances,
not the proportional increase in the average mortgage balance. The pre-trends, shown in Appendix
Figure A8, are zero on average across the pre-flag removal period. They exhibit a small upward trend
in the year before Chapter 13 flag removal, but this increase is small economically and small relative
to the increases following flag removal.
In the Appendix, we examine heterogeneity in these effects by predicted pre-flag removal credit
score, again following the procedure outlined in the credit score heterogeneity analysis. Appendix
Figure A9 shows trends for the mortgage indicator, and Appendix Table A1 shows the corresponding
parameter estimates. The effect of a flag removal on the probability of having a mortgage is small for
the bottom quartile of the predicted pre-flag removal credit score distribution, but approximately the
same for the top three quartiles of the distribution. The pre-trends for the bottom quartile also show
that there is an increase in mortgage holdings in the quarter before flag removal, suggesting that the
effect of flag removal is slightly underestimated for this subsample.
In both the pooled and subsample results, there is also an apparent reversal in the mortgage
outcomes, with values for the Chapter 13 filers falling below those for Chapter 7 filers approximately
three years after flag removal. In Appendix Figure A10, we further investigate this apparent reversal,
focusing on the extensive margin of having any mortgage. Panel A shows the net flow into having a
mortgage. Positive net flow is the result of a new mortgage origination, and a negative net flow is the
result of consumers paying off their mortgage, selling their home, or losing their home in foreclosure.
The figure shows a nearly 2 percentage point increase in the net flow into mortgages in the quarter of
flag removal, underscoring the sharp on-impact effect of the treatment. Consistent with the reversal
in mortgage outcomes, however, Chapter 13 filers have lower net flows in the years following the flag
removal.
In Panels B and C, we explore this issue further by estimating effects before and after the start of
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the 2008 Financial Crisis. The results are striking. There is a large, almost 3 percentage point on-impact
effect of flag removal on net mortgage flows during the 2008 to 2011 period. In the pre-crisis period,
however, there is no on-impact effect of flag removal on net mortgage flows, and a decline in net flows
for Chapter 13 relative to Chapter 7 following flag removal. This decline in net flows for Chapter 13
after the flag removal indicates that our research design performs poorly at longer time horizons for
mortgage outcomes, particularly during the pre-crisis period. Since homeownership is an important
determinant of the choice between a Chapter 13 versus Chapter 7 filing, it is perhaps unsurprising
that our research design performs relatively worse for this outcome variable. We therefore prefer to
focus on the on-impact mortgage results that are less likely to be affected by this issue.
For these on-impact estimates, our results suggest an economically large effect of flag removal
on mortgage originations and mortgage balances, particularly following the 2008 Financial Crisis.
These results are consistent with widespread mortgage access in the run-up to the Financial Crisis,
with the subprime mortgage market providing loans to consumers with blemished credit reports,
and substantial pent-up demand during the post-crisis period, with tighter lending standards in the
subprime market. The timing and size of the effect suggest that consumers are aware of the date of
flag removal or apply for a mortgage on a frequent enough basis to generate a rapid response. The
size of the mortgage effect also underscores the importance of credit scores and bankruptcy flags in
this market, a potentially surprising result given the role of other factors like down payments and
income-based requirements that are also used to screen mortgage applicants.
4.4 Labor Market Outcomes
Our analysis of labor market outcomes follows the above analysis of financial outcomes. On the
extensive margin, we examine the effects of flag removal on (i) formal sector employment, (ii) self-
employment, and (iii) the combination of either formal sector employment or self-employment. We
also examine effects on (iv) formal sector wage earnings, (v) self-employment earnings, and (vi) total
earnings from both formal sector employment and self-employment. We use the natural logarithm of
each earnings measure, as the distributions of earnings are right-skewed. We again add one to each
of the earnings measures so that we can keep observations with no reported earnings; prior to flag
removal, approximately 18.0 percent of Chapter 13 filers have no formal sector earnings, 93.3 percent
have no reported self-employment earnings, and 14.9 percent have no earnings of either type.
Figure 5 shows averages of these outcomes for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers for each quar-
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ter relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal. Table 5 shows estimates from our parametric
difference-in-differences specification that pools the effect across the first, second, and third years after
flag removal. Appendix Figure A11 plots the coefficient of interest from our non-parametric specifi-
cation shown in Equation (1).
In contrast to the financial outcomes, there is no evidence of economically significant effects of
flag removal on labor market outcomes, at least for the average bankruptcy filer. At three years after
filing, flag removal increases wage employment by a statistically and economically insignificant 0.2
percentage points on a pre-flag removal mean of 82.0 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval
allows us to rule out employment effects larger than about 0.4 percentage points.26 Similarly, we find
that flag removal has virtually no effect on log wages (plus one) with a narrow 95 percent confidence
interval. The effect on formal sector employment is statistically distinguishable from zero at a two-
year time horizon, but the magnitudes are economically small both the formal sector employment and
earnings outcomes at all of the time horizons.
Flag removal also has no discernible effect on self-employment, and the 95 percent confidence
interval allows us to rule out an effect of more than 0.2 percentage points. We similarly estimate an
economically and statistically insignificant effect on self-employment earnings (plus one), with the 95
percent confidence interval ruling out effects greater than 3 percent. Not surprisingly, given the null
effects for both the formal and self-employment outcomes, we also find no effect of flag removal on
the outcomes that combine the formal sector and self-employment measures.
In summary, none of our results suggest economically important effects of flag removal on the
labor market outcomes of the average bankruptcy filer. Consistent with our earlier results, there is
also no evidence of different pre-trends for any of our labor market outcomes. Thus, our identifying
assumption also appears to be valid for these outcomes.
4.4.1 Heterogeneity Analysis and Robustness
Our results thus far have shown that there are no economically important effects of bankruptcy flag
removal on labor market outcomes, at least for the average filer. Because of the contrary anecdo-
tal evidence, we conduct a broad set of heterogeneity and sensitivity analyses of these labor market
results.
26The downward trend in wage employment is not unique to our sample. In Appendix Figure A12, we examine employ-
ment trends for individuals of similar ages (age 30 to 55 in 2003) in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID). In the
PSID data, the percentage of individuals with positive hours worked and positive labor income follows a similar downward
trend.
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Demographic Heterogeneity: An important consideration is whether the zero effects for the average
filer mask positive effects for specific subgroups. In particular, many advocates of restricting employer
credit checks have argued that minorities are most likely to suffer adverse labor market consequences
from poor credit reports, although it is unclear whether this is because these advocates think deroga-
tory items are more common for this subset of the population or because they think that the casual
effect of having a derogatory item is larger for this group.
Table 6 investigates this claim by reporting estimates of the effect of flag removal on formal sector
employment for mutually exclusive subsets of the sample determined by the full interaction of gender,
race (defined as either white or non-white), and age (defined as either younger or older than 40 years
old at flag removal). The effects are economically small for all of the demographic groups and there is
no evidence of consistently larger effects for minority groups.
To investigate heterogeneity in the estimates more broadly, Figure 6 plots the estimated effects of
flag removal on formal sector employment at three years for 576 mutually exclusive subsamples de-
termined by the full interaction of gender, race, age, and state of filing. The parameter estimates in the
histogram are weighted by the number of underlying observations so that estimates from subsamples
with a large number of individuals are more prominent. The employment estimates in our sample are
precisely and symmetrically clustered around a median value of 0.391 and mean value of 0.371. The
small number of estimates that are statistically significant at the one percent level only accounts for 2.0
percent of the overall sample, only slightly higher than we would have expected from noise alone.27
Results are qualitatively similar at different time horizons and for our other labor market outcomes.
Thus, while we cannot definitively rule out positive employment effects for every subgroup, these
results suggest that any positive outliers are likely to be the result of statistical noise.
Business Cycle Differences: The zero average effect could also mask differences in strong and weak
labor markets. For example, it is possible that employers were willing to overlook any blemishes on
filers’ credit reports during the strong labor market in the first six years of our sample period (i.e. 2002
to 2007). Appendix Figure A13 and Appendix Table A2 investigate this issue by reporting effects for
filers whose flags were removed in 2002 to 2007 (the “boom”) and for filers whose flags were removed
in 2008 to 2011 (“the bust”). The employment effects are statistically indistinguishable across the two
time periods, although the point estimates are slightly larger in 2008 to 2011 when labor markets were




Labor Market Transitions: A related concern is whether the zero average effects mask large effects
for individuals on the margin of the labor force. For instance, individuals who are currently unem-
ployed might benefit the most from a bankruptcy flag removal. An analysis that looks at the overall
employment rate might miss a positive effect for this group of individuals. To examine the effect
on different groups, we define indicator variables for whether someone who had a job in the previ-
ous year takes on a new job (“change job”), maintains the same job (“same job”’), or no longer has
a job (“end job”). And we define indicators for whether someone who did not have a job in the
prior year finds a job (“start job”) or continues to be without work (“no job”). Appendix Figure A14
shows trends for these indicators and Table A3 reports parameter estimates from the corresponding
difference-in-differences regressions. There are no economically significant effects on any of these
outcome variables, and the 95 percent confidence intervals rule out effects larger than 0.2 percentage
points for the “start job” transition at a three-year time horizon, where one might have expected to see
an economically significant effect.
Industry Churn: The zero average effects may also mask churn across industries. For instance, a
survey by the Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM, 2010) indicates that credit checks are
used more frequently for jobs that involve “fiduciary and financial responsibility,” which are concen-
trated in the finance industry. At the other extreme, federal, state and local agencies are prohibited
from considering bankruptcy in a hiring decision.28 Appendix Figures A15 shows employment trends
by industry and Appendix Table A4 shows the parameter estimates. In short, there is no economically
significant evidence of a reallocation of employment towards finance or any other systemic trends in
the effects across industries. For the financial industry, we can rule out effects greater than 0.2 percent
with 95 percent confidence at any time horizon.
Heterogeneity by State Bans: In principle, our zero effect might be partially explained by the state
bans on credit checks that were introduced in the last few years of our sample (Clifford and Shoag,
2016). In response to fears of discriminatory hiring practices due to credit checks, 11 states have
banned the practice of credit checks over the past decade (see Appendix Table A5 for a list of states
with credit check bans). In states with a ban on credit checks, we would not be surprised to find a zero
28See, for example: http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/will-bankruptcy-affect-my-job-
future-employment.html.
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effect of bankruptcy flag removal on employment, as this information is not available to potential
employers. To account for this margin, we split our data into three groups: individuals filing in states
that never have a ban, individuals filing in states that implement a ban after their flag removal, and
individuals filing in states that implement a ban before their flag removal (but after their filing date).
Appendix Table A6 shows that in all three cases, there is no statistically or economically significant
effect of Chapter 13 flag removal on the probability of formal sector employment. Results are again
qualitatively similar for our other labor market outcomes.
Externality Validity: Our primary difference-in-differences research design identifies the LATE of
removing a bankruptcy flag seven years after filing. In interpreting the null effects on labor market
outcomes, a natural question is whether employers consider a seven-year-old bankruptcy filing to
be important relative to other derogatory items that could appear on a job applicant’s credit report,
such as foreclosure or default flags. The SHRM (2010) survey sheds some light on this matter. Firms
were asked, “how many years of credit history are the most influential in your assessment of the job
candidate’s credit standing?” In response, 33 percent reported focusing on time horizons of “up to
6 or 7 years” and a further 25 percent indicated they considered longer time horizons. Moreover,
across industries and occupations, firms report that bankruptcies are one of the most important items
they consider, along with whether the consumer had accounts in collection or current outstanding
judgments. In contrast, firms did not place much weight on whether the job applicant had medical or
education debt or whether they had a foreclosure flag on their report.
Even so, we would not want to extrapolate from our results on the effects of bankruptcy flag
removal to the effects of a broader restriction on employer credit checks if employers place weight
on other derogatory items or down-weight a seven-year-old bankruptcy flag relative to a more recent
flag. To address this potential limitation, we conduct a separate difference-in-differences analysis of
the state-level bans on employer credit checks that were implemented in the second half of our sample
period. To focus on individuals affected by the ban, we restrict our analysis to individuals who filed
for either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the prior four to six years.29 To maintain a balanced
sample, we also drop states that implemented bans after 2010, because our data does not allow us to
track outcomes for a full three years after implementation.30
29We exclude individuals who filed seven or more years ago as their bankruptcy flags have already been removed and
individuals who filed in three or fewer years to maintain a balanced sample, as we only have data on bankruptcy filers
through 2009 but the majority of the state bans occurred since 2010 (see Appendix Table A5).
30However, for the years we can observe, including these states does not affect the results. These results are available
23
The top row of Appendix Figure A16 shows trends in the fraction employed among bankruptcy
filers who reside in states that implemented a ban in 2007, states that implemented a ban in 2010,
and control states that never implemented a ban.31 The bottom row of Appendix Figure A16 shows
difference-in-difference plots of the effect of the bans including all states that implemented bans be-
tween 2007-2010. The left column shows outcomes for Chapter 7 filers and the right column shows
outcomes for Chapter 13 filers. Appendix Table A7 shows the corresponding difference-in-differences
coefficient estimates for the full set of labor market outcomes.
We find no evidence of an effect of the state credit check bans on labor market outcomes. The
trend and difference-in-differences plots show parallel trends for employment prior to ban imple-
mentation. While employment plummets between 2007 and 2010, employment for treatment and
control states continue on parallel trends following the implementation of the bans. For Chapter 7
filers, there is a slight decrease in employment in treated states, although the effects are not statisti-
cally distinguishable from zero at most time horizons. For Chapter 13 filers, the point estimates are
small and statistically insignificant at all time horizons. The patterns are very similar for the full set of
employment and earnings measures shown in Appendix Table A7.32
While the state bans we analyze were implemented during the height of the Financial Crisis when
counterfactual labor market outcomes were naturally harder to determine, we interpret these esti-
mates as being broadly consistent with the results from our analysis of bankruptcy flag removal, bol-
stering the externality validity of these findings.
In sum, we find zero effect of flag removal on average, and zero effect across different demo-
graphic groups, including minorities, for whom there have been particular concerns about the em-
ployment consequences of derogatory credit reports. We find economically small effects across the
business cycle, including just after the Financial Crisis when labor markets were particularly tight.
We find no effect on employment dynamics, including the “no job” to “any job” transition, where
one might expect to see the largest employment response. We find no evidence that employment
shifts towards industries like finance, which use credit checks more frequently to screen applicants.
Finally, we find no employment effects in states that did not implement bans on credit checks (or in
states that implemented bans), and no evidence of an effect of these bans on labor market outcomes for
upon request.
31We omit Hawaii from Appendix Figure A16 because Hawaii’s ban was implemented in 2009 and would add an addi-
tional line to the plots. Hawaii is included in all estimated results, however. Results are identical if Hawaii is omitted.
32Results are similar if we limit the analysis to Washington, the single state implementing a ban before the Financial Crisis.
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bankruptcy filers, indicating that the zero employment effect we estimate is not limited to the removal
of bankruptcy flags at a seven-year time horizon.
5 Interpretation
In this section, we consider two potential explanations for the zero labor market effect. The first
is offsetting effects on labor supply and demand. The second is that bankruptcy flags are not an
informative signal for employers, who already have substantial information on job applicants.
5.1 Labor Supply versus Labor Demand
In principle, a zero labor market effect might stem from countervailing effects on labor supply and
demand. In particular, since a flag removal increases access to credit, it might reduce labor supply
through a credit smoothing channel, thereby offsetting any increase in employers’ labor demand.
The zero effect of state-level bans on employer credit checks provides evidence against this ex-
planation. Since these bans did not affect what information lenders can observe, and therefore did
not have a direct effect on access to credit, they should isolate the effect of derogatory credit report
information on employers’ labor demand. The zero effect in this state-ban analysis therefore indicates
that an offsetting labor supply effect is unlikely to explain our result.
In Appendix Section A, we further investigate this theory by exploiting heterogeneity across indi-
viduals in the effect of flag removal on credit access. We show that there is a zero employment effect
across individuals with different pre-flag removal credit card utilization rates, including individuals
with relatively low credit card utilization. Since individuals with low pre-flag removal utilization
were not credit constrained, this analysis isolates a group of individuals for whom changes in em-
ployers’ labor demand should be the dominant force. In a second test, we show that the employment
effect is also zero across individuals with different size increases in credit limits, including individuals
with very small credit limit changes for whom the labor demand effect should again be dominant.
These results provide additional evidence that a countervailing labor supply effect cannot explain the
zero labor market effect.
5.2 Predictive Power of Hidden Bankruptcy Flags
A second potential explanation for the zero labor market effect is that bankruptcy flags are not an
informative signal for employers, who already have substantial information on job applicants. We
investigate this theory by examining the predictive power of “hidden” bankruptcy flags, i.e. recently
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removed bankruptcy flags that are observed by the econometrician but unobserved by both lenders
and employers. Specifically, we test the predictive value of hidden flags by comparing the outcomes
of individuals who had a Chapter 13 flag removed in the prior year (and therefore have a hidden
flag) to observably similar individuals who never declared bankruptcy (and therefore do not have a
hidden flag). The logic behind this test is straightforward – if hidden flags are correlated with future
job performance, then bankruptcy flags should be used when they are observed. If hidden flags have
no predictive power, however, they should also have no causal effect on labor demand.
We begin by examining the predictive power of hidden flags for credit market outcomes as a
benchmark for the labor market results. For these credit market results, we construct a sample of
Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers in the first quarter after flag removal and randomly matched non-filers.
We then follow this sample over time to estimate the association between a hidden bankruptcy flag
and the cumulative delinquency rate over the next three years, controlling for credit scores in the
baseline period. Letting i denote individuals and t index quarters relative to the quarter of bankruptcy
flag removal, we run regressions of the form:
1(Delinquency at Horizon t)i = βt · 1(Hidden Chapter 13i) + γXi + f (Credit Scorei,t=1) + ε i (2)
where 1(Delinquency) is a cumulative indicator of whether the individual has been at least 30 days
past due between the first quarter after flag removal and t, 1(Hidden Chapter 13i) is an indicator
for having a hidden Chapter 13 flag, Xi is an indicator for the presence of delinquencies in the first
period (i.e. 1(Delinquencyi,t=1)), and f (Credit Scorei,t=1) is a fully non-parametric control in credit
score in the first period after bankruptcy flag removal, interacted with time fixed effects. The βt’s
are the coefficients of interest and measure the predictive power of a hidden bankruptcy flag on the
delinquency probability at different time horizons.
Panels A and B of Figure 7 show the results from this analysis for credit card and mortgage debt,
respectively. For non-filers, we plot the cumulative probability of delinquency. For bankruptcy filers,
we plot the non-filer mean plus the relevant βt from Equation (2). The estimates in Figure 7 show
that hidden bankruptcy flags are strongly predictive of a delinquency. In Table 7, we present the βt
for the credit results in the first two rows. At a three-year horizon, individuals with a hidden flag are
6.4 percentage points more likely to have a credit card delinquency relative to a non-filer mean of 19.3
percent, or 33 percent. For mortgage debt, individuals with a hidden flag are 10.8 percentage points
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more likely to have a delinquency relative to a non-filer mean of 11.75 percent, or 91.91 percent. These
results indicate that hidden bankruptcy flags have substantial information content for credit market
outcomes.
To examine the information content of bankruptcy flags in the labor market, we construct a sample
of Chapter 13 filers who started a new job in the first full year after flag removal and randomly selected
non-filers who started a job in the same year. We then compare employment outcomes over the next
three years for individuals with and without a hidden bankruptcy flag, controlling for industry and
wage decile at the initial employer and for sex, race, and age. Letting i denote individuals and t denote
years relative to the year of bankruptcy flag removal, we run regressions of the form:
1(Same Job at Horizon t)i = βt · 1(Hidden Chapter 13i) +Wage Decilei,t=1 × Industryi,t=1 + γXi + ε i,
(3)
where 1(Same Jobit) is an indicator for whether the individual remains at the same job, 1(Hidden Chapter 13i)
is an indicator for having a hidden Chapter 13 flag, Wage Decilei,t=1 × Industryi,t=1 is a fully inter-
acted set of controls for wage decile and industry in the first year after flag removal interacted with
time fixed effects, and Xi includes controls for gender, race, and age. The βt’s are the coefficients of
interest and capture the predictive power of hidden bankruptcy flags on the propensity to stay at the
same job. We also estimate results for any employment and log wages (plus one) at both the same
employer or any employer as alternative measures of job performance.
Panels C and D of Figure 7 show results for the probability of being employed at the same job and
the probability of being employed at any job, respectively. Following the credit market results, we
plot the non-filer mean and the sum of the non-filer mean and the relevant βt for each labor market
outcome. In contrast to the credit market results, there is little discernible difference in the labor mar-
ket outcomes of individuals with and without a hidden bankruptcy flag after we control for starting
industry and wage decile. In Table 7, we see that at a three-year horizon, the difference in the prob-
ability of being at the same job is less than 0.1 percentage points on a non-filer mean of 35.2 percent.
For employment at any firm, the difference is less than 0.3 percentage points on a non-filer mean of
83.9 percent. We find similarly precise zero results for log wages (plus one) both at the same employer
or any employer.
Thus, at least for these outcomes, bankruptcy flags seems to have little predictive power for future
job performance, rationalizing the zero labor market effects documented above.
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5.3 Why Do Employers Buy Credit Reports?
If credit reports do not matter for predicting employment outcomes, why do employers purchase this
information? There are a number of potential explanations. Perhaps the most straightforward reason
is to reduce legal liability and to comply with state-level legal requirements. According to the SHRM
(2010) survey, 27 percent of firms report that the primary reason for conducting a credit background
check is to reduce legal liability for negligent hiring, and a further seven percent report that the pri-
mary reason is to comply with state laws requiring background checks for certain professions (e.g.,
day care teachers, licensed medical practitioners).
A somewhat more involved explanation is that credit checks are a less costly way to screen job
applicants who counterfactually would have been screened out later in the hiring process. To give a
concrete example, suppose that virtually all job applicants who fail a credit check also fail a reference
check on performance at prior jobs. However, suppose that a credit check is cheaper to the firm than
the reference check. Then it is optimal to conduct and reject applicants based on the credit checks
even if exogenously varying the outcome of the credit check has no impact on the hiring decision on
the margin. Such a model would also explain the anecdotal evidence cited in the media. It would
be natural for people who failed a credit check to attribute their unemployment to their credit report,
even though if they had counterfactually passed the credit check, they still would have been denied
the job.
A third explanation is that credit report data is cheap, employers hold the prior belief that “more
information is better”, and that most employers have not conducted the type of systematic analysis
needed to overturn their incorrect prior. Employer credit checks cost about $10 to $15 when purchased
separately, and credit check information is often bundled with other background check information
which might be valuable.33 For employers to be able to rule out a performance effect that would
justify an expenditure of this size, the employer would need to see ex-post outcomes for a very large
sample of otherwise identical employees, a challenge that would be difficult to surmount without a
large amount of high-quality data.
6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the causal effect of improved credit reports on credit and labor market outcomes.
We find that the removal of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag leads to large increases in credit scores and
33See, for example: https://www.goodhire.com/employment-credit-report
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both credit card and mortgage borrowing. In sharp contrast, we find a precise zero effect of im-
proved credit reports on employment and earning outcomes. We rationalize these contrasting results
by showing that, conditional on basic observables, “hidden” bankruptcy flags are strongly correlated
with adverse credit market outcomes but have no predictive power for labor market outcomes. We
conclude that credit reports are most important for outcomes where they are the primary source of
information used in screening applicants, such as credit card or mortgage borrowing, but are of lim-
ited consequence for outcomes where a broad range of additional information is available, such as
hiring decisions. Our results also indicate that recent political attempts to limit the use of credit re-
ports by employers are unlikely to affect labor market outcomes, either positively or negatively, for
the targeted populations.
There are at least three caveats to our analysis. First, job transitions are infrequent occurrences,
so any effects of creditworthiness may not be reflected over the three-year time horizons we currently
examine. Second, the zero average effects we estimate for labor market outcomes do not rule out
the existence of some groups of individuals who are affected by flag removal. In our heterogeneity
analysis, we find economically small, but statistically significant, effects for some subgroups of the
population, and so cannot rule out completely the presence of an effect for some subgroups. Finally,
the effects of other changes in the creditworthiness, such as the removal of a foreclosure flag or delin-
quent debt flag, may be different than the effects examined here. While our analysis of state bans on
employer credit checks suggests that our results have broader external validity, estimating the effects
of other improvements in creditworthiness is an important area of future work.
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Figure 1: Economic Interpretation of Credit Score
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Note: Panel A of this figure plots the distribution of credit scores for a representative sample of the
FRBNY Consumer Credit Panel / Equifax data in 2005q1 and the credit scores for our analysis sample of
bankruptcy filers 6 years after filing. Panel B of this figure uses the representative sample from Panel A
and plots the observed fraction of individuals with a tradeline that is at least 90 days past due (90+ DPD)
in 2007q1 against the observed credit score in 2005q1.
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Figure 2: Credit Score Trends
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Note: This figure plots average credit scores and the implied probability of default for Chapter 13 and Chapter
7 bankruptcy filers. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag
removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and
the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average
value of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter
13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the
bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes
for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
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Figure 3: Credit Card Trends
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Note: This figure plots the average credit card outcomes for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers. The
horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7
years after filing. The vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter
7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for
Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who
were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had
their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the
outcome measures and sample.
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Figure 4: Mortgage Trends
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Note: This figure plots the average mortgage outcomes for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers. The
horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7
years after filing. The vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter
7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for
Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who
were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had
their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the
outcome measures and sample.
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Figure 5: Labor Market Trends
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Note: This figure plots the average labor market outcomes for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers.
The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the year of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7
years after filing. The dashed vertical lines show the year of Chapter 13 flag removal and the year Chapter 7
flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for
Chapter 13 filers in the year prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who
were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had
their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the
outcome measures and sample.
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Stat. Significant = 2.0%
Not Significant = 98.0%
Note: This figure plots the distribution of difference-in-differences estimates for employment at three years at
the gender × race × age × state level. We weight each estimate by the number of observations. We also report
the fraction of estimates that are statistically significant at the 1 percent level from standard errors clustered at
the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes
for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
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Figure 7: Ex Post Informativeness of Removed Bankruptcy Flags
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Note: These figures plot outcomes for Chapter 13 filers following the removal of their bankruptcy flag, and use
non-filers as a control group for these filers. Figure A reports the cumulative probability of having a credit card
delinquency in the next 16 quarters following the bankruptcy flag removal. These probabilities are estimated
by randomly matching a sample of non-filers to each bankruptcy flag removal year-quarter cohort, and non-
parametrically controlling for the flag removal year-quarter interacted with credit score after flag removal. Non-
filer probabilities are reported as the mean for the non-filer group over time. Bankruptcy filer probabilities
are reported as the mean for the non-filer group plus the estimated coefficient from the previously described
regression. Figure B reports the same analysis on mortgage delinquencies. Figure C uses a sample of Chapter 13
bankruptcy filers and randomly selected non-filers who both start new jobs the first full year after bankruptcy
flag removal. The figure reports the estimated probability of remaining with the same employer, controlling
for bankruptcy-cohort-year fixed effects interacted with industry-by-wage-decile fixed effects. The regressions
also control for sex, race and age. The non-filer probabilities are reported as the mean for the non-filer group
over time, while the bankruptcy filer probabilities are reported as the mean for the non-filer group plus the
estimated coefficient from the previously described regression. Figure D reports the same analysis on the overall
probability of employment.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Chapter 13 Filers Chapter 7 Filers Pooled
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Credit Report Data: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit Score 597.91 83.92 603.47 78.35 603.05 78.88
Implied Probability of Default (%) 31.73 20.62 29.61 20.21 29.53 20.25
Credit Card Limits 3,723.49 17,339.53 4,825.85 17,092.70 4,727.96 17,117.63
Credit Card Balance 2,156.37 4,411.27 2,818.43 6690.24 2,763.04 6,522.90
Mortgage Loan (%) 41.64 49.30 32.57 46.86 33.37 47.16
Log(Mortgage Balance + 1) 4.73 5.62 3.73 5.42 3.82 5.45
Labor Market Data:
Wage Employment (%) 85.99 28.98 80.70 32.85 81.22 32.52
Self-Employment (%) 5.64 18.17 6.58 19.55 6.49 19.42
Any Employment (%) 88.51 26.06 83.76 30.34 84.24 29.97
Wage Earnings 39,732.03 31,050.10 33,845.94 31,842.77 34,435.19 31,804.39
Self-Employment Earnings 650.71 3,655.36 738.75 4,205.72 729.94 4,153.99
Total Earnings 40,382.74 25,737.98 34,584.69 25,645.06 35,165.13 25,712.44
Log(Wages + 1) 9.00 3.22 8.31 3.60 8.38 3.57
Log(Self-Employment Earnings + 1) 0.49 0.57 1.75 0.08 0.56 1.74
Log(Earnings + 1) 9.24 2.91 8.60 3.34 8.66 3.31
Note: This table reports summary statistics. The Chapter 13 sample includes individuals who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal,
successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The Chapter 7 sample includes
individuals with the same characteristics, but whose flag was removed 12 quarters after. All outcomes are measured for the 11 quarters before and after
the Chapter 13 flag removal. Credit and mortgage outcomes come from quarterly CCP data. Labor market outcomes come from administrative tax data at
the SSA. This quarterly CCP data sample includes 365,798 unique Chapter 7 filers and 35,671 unique Chapter 13 filers for a total of 401,469 unique filers.
The SSA sample includes 4,221,999 unique Chapter 7 filers and 469,676 unique Chapter 13 filers for a total of 4,691,675 filers. Credit Score is the Equifax
Risk Score 3.0 measure, described in the text. Implied Probability of Default is the estimated probability of having a 90+ day delinquent loan two years
later. Credit Card Limits and Credit Card Balance are calculated as the sum of bank card and retail card lines of credit. Mortgage Loan is an indicator for
having a mortgage loan. Employment is an indicator for non-zero wage earnings, self-employment is an indicator for non-zero self-employment earnings,
and any employment is an indicator for non-zero wage or self-employment earnings. All indicator measures are scaled by 100 to calculate percentages.
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Table 2: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Credit Scores
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Score 596.49 9.76 6.31 3.16
(77.29) (0.32) (0.50) (0.65)
Implied Probability of Default 31.61 −2.63 −1.55 −0.56
(20.05) (0.10) (0.15) (0.19)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag
removal on credit scores. Column 1 reports the dependent variable mean and standard deviation for
Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag
removal from 0-3, 4-7, and 8-11 quarters, respectively. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7
filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy
process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The regressions include
23,772,930 person-year-quarter observations for 401,469 unique individuals. Standard errors, in paren-
theses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-year-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the
specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
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Table 3: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Credit Card Outcomes
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Credit Card Limits 3,027.44 382.32 1, 093.67 1, 509.58
(5,379.76) (38.09) (84.49) (108.94)
Credit Card Balance 1,911.02 143.19 538.32 799.76
(3,538.36) (17.25) (37.06) (52.25)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
flag removal on credit card outcomes. Column 1 reports the dependent variable mean and standard
deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients
on the effect of flag removal from 0-3, 4-7, and 8-11 quarters, respectively. The sample includes
Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, success-
fully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between
2002-2011. The regressions include 23,772,930 person-year-quarter observations for 401,469 unique
individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-year-by-state
level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional
details on the outcome measures and sample.
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Table 4: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Mortgage Outcomes
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mortgage Loan 41.28 1.87 1.80 1.00
(49.23) (0.22) (0.27) (0.31)
Log(Mortgage Balance + 1) 4.70 0.21 0.21 0.11
(5.62) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
flag removal on mortgage outcomes. Column 1 reports the dependent variable mean and standard
deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients
on the effect of flag removal from 0-3, 4-7, and 8-11 quarters, respectively. The sample includes
Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, success-
fully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between
2002-2011. The regressions include 23,772,930 person-year-quarter observations for 401,469 unique
individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-year-by-state
level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional
details on the outcome measures and sample.
42
Table 5: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Labor Market Outcomes
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage Employment 82.02 0.16 0.23 0.17
(19.90) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Self-Employment 6.66 0.02 0.07 0.09
(3.79) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Any Employment 85.13 0.15 0.24 0.16
(16.52) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
Log(Wages + 1) 8.45 0.00 −0.00 −0.02
(2.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Self-Emp. Earnings + 1) 0.58 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Log(Earnings + 1) 8.75 0.00 0.00 −0.02
(1.75) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag re-
moval on labor market outcomes. Column 1 reports the dependent variable mean and standard deviation
for Chapter 13 filers in the year prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag
removal for years 1-3. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the
time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy
flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The regressions include 32,797,030 person-year observations
for 4,691,675 unique individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-
state level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details
on the outcome measures and sample.
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Table 6: Employment Results by Filer Characteristics
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
White Males 30-39 87.58 0.35 0.68 0.75
(22.51) (0.14) (0.15) (0.17)
Non-White Males 30-39 85.74 0.15 0.34 0.30
(25.34) (0.18) (0.21) (0.22)
White Males 40-54 79.57 0.19 0.40 0.36
(31.04) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14)
Non-White Males 40-54 79.79 0.17 0.15 0.15
(31.25) (0.16) (0.18) (0.18)
White Females 30-39 83.12 0.21 −0.02 0.15
(25.85) (0.23) (0.27) (0.29)
Non-White Females 30-39 88.44 0.30 0.37 0.40
(22.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23)
White Females 40-54 79.43 0.06 0.15 0.19
(31.00) (0.14) (0.17) (0.18)
Non-White Females 40-54 84.00 0.19 0.14 −0.09
(28.06) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13
bankruptcy flag removal separately by borrower subgroup. Column 1 reports the depen-
dent variable mean and standard deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the year prior to flag
removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag removal for years 1-3. The
sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter
13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy
flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The regressions include 32,797,030 person-year
observations for 4,691,675 unique individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered
at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the specification
and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
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Table 7: Ex Post Informativeness of Removed Bankruptcy Flags
Difference-in-Difference Estimates
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(Credit Card Delinquency) 3.21 4.91 6.36
(0.31) (0.33) (0.34)
Pr(Mortgage Delinquency) 5.42 8.13 10.79
(0.20) (0.24) (0.28)
Pr(Same Job) −2.33 −0.62 −0.03
(0.25) (0.27) (0.27)
Pr(Employed) −1.86 −0.79 −0.27
(0.13) (0.15) (0.17)
Log(Wage+1) (Cond. Same Job) −0.24 −0.09 −0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log(Wage+1) −0.15 −0.05 −0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Note: The table presents estimates of the effect of a removed Chapter 13 bankruptcy
flag compared to a sample of non-filers. The sample is constructed by matching the
sample of Chapter 13 bankruptcy filers in the first quarter after flag removal and a
random sample of non-filers. We then follow this sample over time to estimate the
association between a hidden bankruptcy flag. For credit outcomes, we control non-
parametrically for credit scores from the first quarter after flag removal, interacted with
time fixed effects. For labor outcomes, we control for a fully interacted set of controls
wage decile and industry in the first year after flag removal, as well as gender, race,
and age. Column 1 reports the difference between the two groups after 4 quarters,
Column 2 after 8 quarters, and Column 3 after 12 quarters. The regressions include
13,024,000 person-year observations for 1,001,846 unique individuals. Standard errors,
in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. See the text for additional details on the
specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and
sample.
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Consequences of Bad Credit Reports
Online Appendix
Will Dobbie Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham Neale Mahoney Jae Song
A Additional Evidence on Labor Supply versus Labor Demand
We further investigate the potential for offsetting labor supply and demand effects by exploiting het-
erogeneity across individuals in the effect of flag removal on credit access. The first form of hetero-
geneity we use is based on pre-flag removal credit card utilization. It is plausible that individuals
with higher pre-flag removal credit card utilization are relatively more credit constrained, and should
therefore experience larger increases in credit access and larger decreases in labor supply compared to
individuals with lower pre-flag removal credit card utilization. Thus, if our zero labor market effect
is explained by a reduction of labor supply, the employment effect should be downward sloping in
pre-flag removal credit limits, with larger employment effects for individuals who had low pre-flag
removal utilization (and were never credit constrained), and smaller employment effects for individ-
uals who had high levels of pre-flag removal utilization (and were most likely to have reduced their
labor supply in response to flag removal).
Panel A of Appendix Figure A17 shows results from this heterogeneity analysis. The plot is con-
structed by estimating the effect of flag removal for groups of individuals defined by the full interac-
tion of state of residence and five-year age bins. We then show a binned scatter plot of the employment
effect against the average pre-flag removal utilization rate for each group. The best fit line is based
on the underlying group-level data, with each group weighted by the number of underlying obser-
vations and standard errors clustered at the state level. There is substantial heterogeneity in pre-flag
removal credit card utilization, with rates varying from 65 percent to more than 85 percent across the
binned groups. However, the employment response is completely homogeneous across these groups,
with the slope of the best fit line statistically indistinguishable from zero.
The second form of heterogeneity we use arises from variation in the size of the effect of flag
removal on credit limits. Individuals who receive larger increases in credit limits experience a larger
increase in credit access, and should therefore reduce their labor supply more than individuals who
receive smaller increases in credit limits. If our zero labor market effects are explained by a reduction
of labor supply, the employment effect should be negatively correlated with the credit limit effect, with
larger employment effects for individuals who had small credit limit effects (and thus were mainly
exposed to an increase in employers’ labor demand) and smaller employment effects for individuals
who had larger credit limit effects.
Panel B of Appendix Figure A17 plots the employment effect against the effect on credit limits,
constructed in an analogous manner to Panel A. While there is substantial variation in the change in
credit limits across groups, with the size of the effect varying by more than $6,000, there is no evidence
that the employment effect is negatively correlated with the credit limit effect, with the slope of the
best fit line statistically indistinguishable from zero. Taken together, this evidence suggests that an
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offsetting labor supply effect cannot explain the zero effect for labor market outcomes, and provides
evidence that these estimates should be interpreted as a zero average effect of flag removal employers’
labor demand.34
34This analysis presumes that the labor market effect is relatively constant across the changes in access to credit. If the
effect on labor demand is correlated with the effect on credit access, the results could still be consistent with offsetting labor
supply and demand effects.
Figure A1: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Credit Scores
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Note: This figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
flag removal on credit scores. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter
of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines show the
quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years
later. The estimated effect is normalized to zero in the quarter before Chapter 13 flag removal
period. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the
chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the
Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A2: Credit Score Trends by Pre-Flag Removal Credit Score
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Note: This figure plots average credit scores for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers by predicted pre-
flag removal credit score. We construct pre-removal credit scores from a linear regression of pre-flag removal
credit score on five-year age buckets and state fixed effects. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters,
relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines
show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years
later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to
flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13
flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime
between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A3: Implied Probability of Default by Pre-Flag Removal Credit Score
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Note: This figure plots average credit scores for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers by predicted pre-
flag removal credit score. We construct pre-removal credit scores from a linear regression of pre-flag removal
credit score on five-year age buckets and state fixed effects. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters,
relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines
show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years
later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to
flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13
flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime
between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A4: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Credit Card Outcomes
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Note: This figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal
on credit card outcomes. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag
removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal
and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. The estimated effect is normalized to zero
in the quarter before Chapter 13 flag removal period. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals
from standard errors clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the
specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A5: Credit Card Limits by Pre-Flag Removal Credit Score
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Note: This figure plots average credit card limits for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers by predicted
pre-flag removal credit score. We construct pre-removal credit scores from a linear regression of pre-flag re-
moval credit score on five-year age buckets and state fixed effects. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters,
relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines
show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years
later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to
flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13
flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime
between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A6: Dose-Response
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Note: This figure shows binned scatter plots of the estimated coefficients from difference-in-differences regres-
sions conducted at the age group × state group level. Panel A plots the dollar increase in credit card limits
against the estimated reduction in the implied probability of default. Panel B plots the dollar increase in credit
card balances against the estimated reduction in the implied probability of default. The solid line shows the best
linear fit estimated on the underlying age-by-state level data weighted by the number of observations within
each group. The coefficients show the estimated slope of the best-fit line, with standard errors clustered at the
state level reported below. The effects on employment and credit limits are at one year after flag removal. See
the text for additional details on the specification.
Figure A7: Credit Card Balance by Pre-Flag Removal Credit Score
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Note: This figure plots average credit card balances for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy filers by pre-
dicted pre-flag removal credit score. We construct pre-removal credit scores from a linear regression of pre-flag
removal credit score on five-year age buckets and state fixed effects. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quar-
ters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical
lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3
years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter
prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time
of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag re-
moved sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and
sample.
Figure A8: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Mortgage Outcomes
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Note: This figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal
on mortgage outcomes. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag
removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal
and the quarter of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. The estimated effect is normalized to zero
in the quarter before Chapter 13 flag removal period. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals
from standard errors clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the
specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A9: Mortgage Loan by Pre-Flag Removal Credit Score
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Note: This figure plots average fraction of individuals with a mortgage for Chapter 13 and Chapter 7
bankruptcy filers by predicted pre-flag removal credit score. We construct pre-removal credit scores from a
linear regression of pre-flag removal credit score on five-year age buckets and state fixed effects. The horizontal
axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after
filing. The dashed vertical lines show the quarter of Chapter 13 flag removal and the quarter of Chapter 7
flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the outcome for
Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who
were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had
their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the
outcome measures and sample.
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Note: This figure plots the net change in the stock of individuals with a mortgage loan. The net
change is calculated as the difference between two objects: the inflow of mortgages, which is the
fraction of individuals who go from having no mortgage in the previous quarter to having a mort-
gage in this quarter; and the outflow of mortgages, which is the fraction of individuals who go from
having a mortgage in the previous quarter to having a mortgage in this quarter. Panel A plots this
net change for the entire sample. Panel B plots this change for individuals whose flag is removed
between 2002 and 2007, inclusive. Panel C plots this change for individuals whose flag is removed
between 2008 and 2011, inclusive.
Figure A11: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Labor Market Outcomes
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Note: This figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal
on labor market outcomes. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the year of Chapter 13
flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines show the year of Chapter 13 flag
removal and the year of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. The estimated effect is normalized
to zero in the year before Chapter 13 flag removal period. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals
from standard errors clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the
specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A12: PSID Employment Trends
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Note: These figures plots the outcomes of all heads of household who are between ages 30 and 55 in 2003. Figure
A reports the average by year of an indicator for hours worked greater than zero. Figure B reports the average
by year of an indicator for labor income greater than zero. Outcomes are weighted by the PSID weights.
Figure A13: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Labor Market Outcomes by Period













-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
Time to Chapter 13 Flag Removal













-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
Time to Chapter 13 Flag Removal
Estimated Coef. 95% Confidence Interval
Note: This figure plots difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal
on labor market outcomes for separate time periods, 2002-2007 and 2008-2011. The horizontal axis denotes time,
in quarters, relative to the year of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical
lines show the year of Chapter 13 flag removal and the year of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years
later. The estimated effect is normalized to zero in the year before Chapter 13 flag removal period. The dashed
lines are 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level.
See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome
measures and sample.
Figure A14: Employment Transitions Trends
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Note: This figure plots the average labor market outcomes of bankruptcy filers to the event of bankruptcy flag
removal. The horizontal axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the year of Chapter 13 flag removal, which
occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical lines show the year of Chapter 13 flag removal and the year
of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are normalized to the average value of the
outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the year prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7
filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process,
and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details
on the outcome measures and sample.
Figure A15: Employment by Industry Trends
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Note: This figure plots the average labor market outcomes of bankruptcy filers to the event of bankruptcy flag removal. The horizontal
axis denotes time, in quarters, relative to the year of Chapter 13 flag removal, which occurs 7 years after filing. The dashed vertical
lines show the year of Chapter 13 flag removal and the year of Chapter 7 flag removal, which occurs 3 years later. Outcomes are
normalized to the average value of the outcome for Chapter 13 filers in the year prior to flag removal. The sample includes Chapter 13
and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had
their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. See the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and
sample.
Figure A16: State Difference-in-Difference
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Note: These figures study the effect of state bans on employment outcomes for individuals who had filed for
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy 4 to 6 years before. Panel A and B plot employment for these filers in three
groups: in states that banned the use of credit reports in employment in 2007 (Washington), banned the use of
credit reports in employment in 2010 (California, Illinois and Oregon) or never banned the use of credit reports.
See Appendix Table A5 for a full list of states. Panel C and D plot the non-parametric difference-in-differences
estimates from these samples relative to the state ban, with the year previous to the ban normalized to 0. The
dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals from standard errors clustered at the state level. See the text for
additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and
sample.
Figure A17: Labor Supply versus Labor Demand
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Note: This figure shows binned scatter plots of the estimated coefficients from difference-in-differences regres-
sions conducted at the age group × state group level. Panel A plots the percentage change in employment
against the average credit card utilization rates in t = −4 for that age group × state bin. Panel B plots the
percentage change in employment against the change in credit limits. The solid line shows the best linear fit es-
timated on the underlying age-by-state level data weighted by the number of observations within each group.
The coefficients show the estimated slope of the best-fit line, with standard errors clustered at the state level
reported below. The effects on employment and credit limits are at one year after flag removal. See the text for
additional details on the specification.
Table A1: Credit Results by Pre-Flag Removal Credit Score
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Score Quartile 1:
Credit Score 578.08 7.35 1.79 −2.14
(75.47) (0.57) (0.83) (0.88)
Implied Probability of Default 37.23 −2.14 −0.44 0.81
(19.62) (0.18) (0.25) (0.27)
Credit Card Limits 2,032.40 260.59 660.85 899.17
(4023.24) (25.84) (50.26) (69.70)
Credit Card Balance 1,429.12 145.92 438.55 604.43
(1,478.73) (22.83) (39.88) (47.54)
Mortgage Loan 37.38 1.45 1.32 0.24
(48.83) (0.31) (0.42) (0.46)
Score Quartile 2:
Credit Score 594.45 10.10 6.80 3.31
(76.77) (0.53) (0.77) (0.93)
Implied Probability of Default 32.20 −2.85 −1.82 −0.68
(20.01) (0.17) (0.24) (0.29)
Credit Card Limits 2,744.24 316.40 906.78 1, 332.98
(4,819.91) (33.91) (64.44) (81.46)
Credit Card Balance 1,782.36 104.75 484.05 796.01
(1,769.85) (26.84) (50.80) (64.95)
Mortgage Loan 40.95 1.90 2.20 1.58
(40.59) (0.33) (0.42) (0.49)
Score Quartile 3:
Credit Score 605.97 9.74 6.99 3.95
(75.42) (0.58) (0.80) (0.94)
Implied Probability of Default 28.73 −2.60 −1.78 −0.79
(19.61) (0.18) (0.24) (0.28)
Credit Card Limits 3,330.31 351.95 1, 078.25 1, 558.36
(5,548) (35.37) (72.00) (94.11)
Credit Card Balance 2,014.13 165.98 626.05 960.59
(3,538.32) (33.79) (46.53) (62.96)
Mortgage Loan 44.34 2.44 1.99 1.25
(49.66) (0.37) (0.47) (0.53)
Score Quartile 4:
Credit Score 619.56 13.72 11.65 9.12
(75.52) (0.63) (0.90) (1.08)
Implied Probability of Default 24.65 −3.33 −2.59 −1.89
(19.36) (0.19) (0.26) (0.31)
Credit Card Limits 4,221.57 599.43 1, 561.89 1, 920.18
(7,162.69) (52.33) (101.34) (129.35)
Credit Card Balance 2,446.28 230.59 781.44 1, 067.64
(4,812.20) (42.15) (68.24) (89.02)
Mortgage Loan 44.66 1.88 1.89 1.08
(49.73) (0.38) (0.48) (0.54)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy flag removal
by predicted pre-flag removal credit score. We construct pre-removal credit scores from a linear regression of
pre-flag removal credit score on five-year age buckets and state fixed effects. Column 1 reports the dependent
variable mean and standard deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the quarter prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4
report coefficients on the effect of flag removal from 0-3, 4-7, and 8-11 quarters, respectively. The sample in-
cludes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully
completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The
regressions include 23,772,930 person-year-quarter observations for 401,469 unique individuals. Standard er-
rors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-year-by-state level. See the text for additional details
on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Table A2: Labor Results by Time Period
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage Employment 2002-2007 83.09 0.14 0.09 0.15
(19.50) (0.06) (0.09) (0.13)
Wage Employment 2008-2011 80.93 0.18 0.36 0.23
(20.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
flag removal on labor market outcomes in two time periods: 2002-2007 and 2008-2011. Column 1
reports the dependent variable mean and standard deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the year prior
to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag removal for years 1-3. The
sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter 13 flag
removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag removed
sometime in 2002-2011. The regressions include 32,797,030 person-year observations for 4,691,675
unique individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state
level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional
details on the outcome measures and sample.
Table A3: Effect of Chapter 13 Flag Removal on Employment Transitions
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Job 59.53 −0.73 −1.13 −1.58
(15.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
Change Job 19.82 0.77 1.28 1.62
(6.50) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
No Job 13.64 −0.21 −0.34 −0.44
(20.76) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
End Job 4.31 0.05 0.11 0.27
(1.67) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Start Job 2.70 0.11 0.08 0.12
(1.16) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13
bankruptcy flag removal on labor market job transitions. Column 1 reports the depen-
dent variable mean and standard deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the year prior to
flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag removal for years
1-3. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the
time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and
had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The regressions in-
clude 32,797,030 person-year observations for 4,691,675 unique individuals. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See the text
for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details
on the outcome measures and sample.
Table A4: Employment Results By Industry
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Missing 30.89 −0.04 −0.05 0.08
(17.40) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14)
Construction 4.17 −0.01 0.04 0.06
(2.56) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Manufacturing 10.51 −0.30 −0.51 −0.72
(5.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
Transportation 5.89 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04
(2.46) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Wholesale 3.70 0.01 0.00 −0.02
(1.62) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Retail 7.76 0.16 0.25 0.33
(2.60) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Finance 4.66 0.04 0.09 0.10
(2.01) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Services 25.82 0.24 0.38 0.49
(8.99) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Public 5.40 −0.07 −0.16 −0.27
(2.49) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13
bankruptcy flag removal on labor market outcomes in each industry. Column 1 reports
the dependent variable mean and standard deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the year
prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag removal for
years 1-3. The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at
the time of Chapter 13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process,
and had their bankruptcy flag removed sometime between 2002-2011. The regressions
include 32,797,030 person-year observations for 4,691,675 unique individuals. Stan-
dard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-cohort-by-state level. See
the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional
details on the outcome measures and sample.
Table A5: State Credit Check Bans












Note: This table lists all states with a law banning employer
credit checks. All states except Washington have an exception
for the financial industry. See Clifford and Shoag (2016) for
additional details.
Table A6: Employment Results and State Bans on Credit Checks for Employment
Mean at Difference-in-Differences Estimates
t = −1 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
States with No Ban 82.07 0.17 0.23 0.19
(18.41) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Pre-Ban in States with Ban 82.03 0.15 0.30 0.16
(28.73) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Post-Ban in States with Ban 79.40 −0.62 −0.62 −0.76
(28.87) (0.49) (0.48) (0.51)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of Chapter 13 bankruptcy
flag removal separately for states with and without bans on credit checks for employment. Column
1 reports the dependent variable mean and standard deviation for Chapter 13 filers in the year
prior to flag removal. Columns 2-4 report coefficients on the effect of flag removal for years 1-3.
The sample includes Chapter 13 and Chapter 7 filers who were age 30-54 at the time of Chapter
13 flag removal, successfully completed the bankruptcy process, and had their bankruptcy flag re-
moved sometime between 2002-2011. The regressions include 32,797,030 person-year observations
for 4,691,675 unique individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the chapter-by-
cohort-by-state level. See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes
for additional details on the outcome measures and sample.
Table A7: Employment Results and State Bans on Credit Checks for Employment, Years 4-6
Difference-in-Difference Estimates
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Chapter 7
Wage Employment −0.28 −0.41 −0.71
(0.18) (0.25) (0.24)
Self-Employment 0.01 −0.03 −0.13
(0.02) (0.04) (0.14)
Any Employment −0.25 −0.36 −0.82
(0.14) (0.22) (0.27)
Log(Wages + 1) −0.03 −0.06 −0.10
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Log(Self-Employment Earnings + 1) 0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Log(Earnings + 1) −0.03 −0.05 −0.11
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Panel B: Chapter 13
Wage Employment −0.06 −0.13 −0.21
(0.20) (0.41) (0.37)
Self-Employment −0.04 −0.07 −0.09
(0.08) (0.09) (0.12)
Any Employment −0.16 −0.14 −0.40
(0.13) (0.36) (0.34)
Log(Wages + 1) −0.01 −0.02 −0.04
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Log(Self-Employment Earnings + 1) −0.00 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log(Earnings + 1) −0.02 −0.02 −0.06
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Panel C: All
Wage Employment −0.26 −0.40 −0.65
(0.18) (0.27) (0.25)
Self-Employment 0.00 −0.03 −0.12
(0.02) (0.04) (0.12)
Any Employment −0.24 −0.34 −0.76
(0.13) (0.24) (0.27)
Log(Wages + 1) −0.03 −0.06 −0.09
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Log(Self-Employment Earnings + 1) −0.00 −0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Log(Earnings + 1) −0.03 −0.05 −0.10
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Note: This table reports difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of state bans on credit checks for em-
ployment for individuals who had filed for bankruptcy 4 to 6 years before. Columns 1-3 report coefficients on
the effect of flag removal for years 1-3 after the ban. The sample in Panel A includes Chapter 7 filers who were
age 30-54 7 years after bankruptcy filing and successfully completed the bankruptcy process. The sample in
Panel B includes Chapter 13 filers who were age 30-54 7 years after bankruptcy filing and successfully com-
pleted the bankruptcy process. Panel C combines both samples. The regressions include 13,024,000 person-year
observations for 1,001,846 unique individuals. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level.
See the text for additional details on the specification and the Table 1 notes for additional details on the outcome
measures and sample.
